Tag Archives: IRP

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The SCC serves up a nothingburger

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Dominion Energy headquarters, Richmond, VA

When Dominion Energy Virginia filed its latest integrated resource plan (IRP) last fall, critics (including me) complained that the company failed to lay out a cost-effective approach that would meet soaring energy demand from data centers while complying with Virginia’s decarbonization mandate. We hoped regulators at the State Corporation Commission would reject the IRP and demand better of our largest utility.

Instead, they chickened out. 

The SCC’s final order, issued July 15, is short but not really to the point. The order finds Dominion’s IRP “legally sufficient,” while citing previous SCC orders for the proposition that “acceptance” doesn’t mean approval “of the magnitude or specifics of Dominion’s future spending plans.” It would be hard to imagine a less enthusiastic endorsement, and the lack of analysis leaves advocates wondering, where’s the meat?

It’s true that an IRP is “only” a planning document; it doesn’t commit a utility to carrying out the plan, and the SCC still has to approve any project the utility decides to move forward with. But the point of the exercise is to ensure utilities are on the right track; that their demand projections are on target and their plans for meeting demand are realistic, cost-effective and comply with all relevant laws. This needs discussion and analysis, not merely an up-or-down vote.

Admittedly, the SCC has a long history of approving lousy IRPs while directing Dominion to do a better job the next time. That was the case here, too, with the order directing Dominion to do a few things differently in its next IRP, due in the fall of 2026. 

First, the SCC wants to see a 20-year timeline instead of the 15-year period that Dominion used this year, which is all the law requires. It’s an obvious ask, even apart from the fact the SCC cites that the regional grid operator PJM uses a 20-year planning window. A better reason is that we are just 20 years away from Dominion’s 2045 deadline for full decarbonization under the Virginia Clean Economy Act (VCEA), and anything the utility does now will have consequences extending out to that deadline. 

The SCC also neglected to mention that using just a 15-year window, and omitting the 25-year planning period that Dominion included in previous IRPs, allowed the company to avoid showing the economic consequences to consumers of spending money for fossil fuel generation that either will shut down or may become economically obsolete by 2045, long before the plants are paid off. If Dominion thinks it can justify sinking customers’ money into assets it knows will become stranded, we all deserve to see the rationale. 

The order also directs Dominion to include in its modeling at least one pathway that complies with the requirement of the VCEA that carbon-emitting facilities (including any new gas plants) be retired by 2045. This goes beyond obvious: the lack of a VCEA-compliant plan should have prompted the SCC to reject the IRP outright. 

But of course, Dominion claims new gas plants are needed for reliability, which would make them legal under the VCEA in spite of their carbon emissions and questionable long-term viability. Reliability is a red herring, as I’ve argued, and other parties to the IRP case modeled how Dominion can meet demand without building new fossil fuels. Dominion should have been required to prove its case.

But here again, the SCC chose not to engage on the issue. Requiring Dominion to do better next time is as far as it is willing to go. This is unfortunate, but the silence can’t last: in March, Dominion filed for approval of the first of its planned new gas plants. The SCC will have to address need and reliability to make a decision in that case, and it would have been better for all concerned if it had grappled with these questions now.

The order falls short in other ways, as well. While the SCC expresses concern about forecasted rate increases, it doesn’t even mention the data centers that are driving the problem. 

This is astonishing; even before Dominion filed its IRP last fall, the commission ordered the company to supplement the record with an analysis of data center impacts. When Dominion did so, it became clear that all of the load growth (and likely, much of the projected rate increases) results from this one industry. It’s beyond strange that the SCC does not even mention the supplement it ordered, or discuss whether Dominion’s duty to serve truly prevents it from protecting existing customers.

The order also accepts Dominion’s argument that it had to artificially limit the amount of low-cost solar it could include in its modeling, due to the increased difficulty of siting solar projects in Virginia. It’s true that many rural counties have been denying permits to solar projects, even as they approve data centers. But I’ve also heard a Dominion lobbyist tell legislators that permit denials have not been a problem for the company, an assertion that may have persuaded some legislators to vote against bills that would make solar siting easier. It appears Dominion tells legislators one thing and the SCC another. 

The SCC’s order contains a few other requirements for the next IRP, mostly things that really should have been included in this one. The IRP should model Virginia’s return to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, reflecting a Virginia court’s ruling that Gov. Glenn Youngkin’s withdrawal was unlawful. The IRP should assume Dominion achieves the energy efficiency targets that the SCC itself established for the company. Dominion should include an analysis of impacts on base rates and should share its modeling with utility watchdog Clean Virginia, as well as run modeling based on SCC staff inputs. Long-duration storage, a maturing technology that can replace gas combustion turbines, should be included in the next modeling.

“Do better next time” is a well-worn directive from the SCC to Dominion, but it is deeply disappointing at a time when Virginia is facing an unprecedented surge in demand from data centers and accompanying increases in utility rates. 

It’s disappointing in another way, too: this is the first major ruling from the SCC since two new judges were added to the three-member commission, and all three were appointed by a Democratically-controlled Senate. If there was ever a time for the SCC to get tough with Dominion on its climate obligations, this should have been it. 

No doubt, the problem lies in Dominion’s influence over the entire process. The utility doles out exceedingly generous campaign donations to members of both parties, so the company retains influence no matter who is in power. Not only does this give Dominion sway over who is appointed to the SCC, but commissioners have to be mindful that getting reappointed at the end of their six-year terms depends on how satisfied these Dominion-backed senators are with their rulings. 

As long as Dominion is allowed to shower senators with unlimited campaign cash, the SCC will never be free of the utility’s pernicious influence. 

Meanwhile, though, Dominion’s poor performance, and the SCC’s unwillingness to call it out, demonstrate the necessity of the comprehensive IRP reform legislation that the governor vetoed this spring. The Commission on Electric Utility Regulation is already working on similar legislation for the next session. 

Passing the IRP reform bill may not inject the SCC with greater courage, but it will ensure the commission, and the public, get a fuller look at the facts.

This article was originally published in the Virginia Mercury on July 21, 2025.

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Under pressure from the SCC, Dominion reveals the true cost of data centers

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New filing shows electricity demand would be flat without the industry

Data center between housing community and a bike path
A data center in Ashburn, Virginia. Photo by Hugh Kenny, Piedmont Environmental Council.

Ever since data centers started spreading across the Virginia landscape like an invasive pest, one important question has remained unanswered: How much does the industry’s insatiable demand for energy impact other utility customers? Under pressure from the SCC, this month Dominion Energy Virginia finally provided the answer we feared: Ordinary Virginia customers are subsidizing Big Tech with both their money and their health.

Dominion previously hid data centers among the rest of its customer base, making it impossible to figure out if residents were paying more than their fair share of the costs of building new generation and transmission lines. Worse, if data centers are the reason for burning more fossil fuels, then they are also responsible for residents being subjected to pollution that is supposed to be eliminated under the 2020 Virginia Clean Economy Act (VCEA). The VCEA calls for most coal plants in the state to be closed by the end of this year – which is not happening – and sets rigorous conditions before utilities can build any new fossil fuel plants. 

Dominion’s 2023 Integrated Resource Plan (IRP), filed a year and a half ago, projected steep increases in energy demand and the cost of electricity. The utility asserted that for reliability purposes it needed to keep coal plants operating, build new methane gas generating units without meeting the VCEA’s conditions, and add small nuclear reactors beginning in 2034.

Dominion’s failure to file a plan that complied with the VCEA led to an unusual stalemate at the SCC, with the IRP neither approved nor rejected. Ignoring the foul-weather warning, Dominion filed a similarly-flawed 2024 IRP in October.  None of the modeled scenarios showed coal plants closing, none met the energy efficiency requirements set by law, and all proposed building new gas and nuclear reactors, with the first small nuclear plant now pushed off to 2035.

Neither of the two filings separated out the role of data centers in driving the changes. 

Even before the 2024 IRP was filed, though, the SCC directed the utility to file a supplement. It was obvious the IRP would project higher costs and increased use of fossil fuels. How much of that, the SCC demanded to know, is attributable to data centers? 

A lot, as it turns out. Though Dominion continues to obfuscate key facts, the document it filed on November 15 shows future data center growth will drive up utility spending by about 20%. Dominion did not take the analysis further to show the effect on residential rates.  

The filing also shows that but for new data centers, peak demand would actually decrease slightly over the next few years, from 17,353 MW this year to 17,280 MW in 2027, before beginning a gentle rise to 17,818 MW in 2034 and 18,608 MW in 2039. 

In other words, without data centers, electricity use in Dominion territory would scarcely budge over the next decade. Indeed, the slight decrease over the next three years is especially interesting because near-term numbers tend to be the most reliable, with projections getting more speculative the further out you look.  

Surprised? You’re not alone. We’ve heard for years that electric vehicles and building electrification will drive large increases in energy demand. When Dominion talks about the challenges of load growth, it cites these factors along with data centers, suggesting that ordinary people are part of the problem. We’re not. 

Decreasing demand is a testament to the profound effect of energy efficiency, as advances in things like lighting, heat pumps and other appliances allow consumers to do more with less. Presumably, the electrification of transportation and buildings will eventually outpace gains in efficiency – no doubt reflected in the projections for slightly increasing demand over the 2030s – but the effect is still modest. Electrification is not to blame for demand growth; data centers are.

In a future without new data centers, there should be no reason for Virginia’s energy transition to get off track. Solar, offshore wind and battery storage could increasingly displace fossil fuels, clean our air and bring down greenhouse gas emissions at an orderly pace. 

At least, that’s the intuitive result, though Dominion fights hard to counter it. The new filing is supposed to show what a VCEA-compliant plan would look like without data centers, but it retains assumptions from its IRPs that skew the results in favor of fossil fuels. These include limiting energy efficiency and artificially capping the amounts of solar and storage that its computer model could select. Obviously, if you won’t invest in low-cost energy efficiency and solar, you need more of something else. 

Dominion’s computer model also doesn’t choose offshore wind in spite of the fact that the 2,600-MW Virginia Coastal Offshore Wind project is under construction. No doubt the higher cost of offshore wind is responsible for this counter-factual omission, but again, leaving it out requires that something else be selected. Nuclear similarly doesn’t make the cut due to cost. 

By limiting or eliminating all zero-carbon options, Dominion would like you to conclude that, with or without data centers, it “needs” more gas plants.

There are other reasons to be skeptical of this manufactured result. As with the 2024 IRP itself, Dominion does not appear to have incorporated the social cost of carbon in its supposedly-VCEA-compliant plan, a mandatory consideration for any new fossil fuel generation. It’s also worth noting that Dominion will once again have to buy carbon emission allowances to run its coal and gas plants now that a court has nullified Gov. Glenn Youngkin’s illegal withdrawal of Virginia from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). (Youngkin has vowed to appeal.) 

On the other hand, President-elect Donald Trump and Republicans in Congress seem likely to overturn new EPA regulations tightening pollution standards for fossil fuel plants. That would make fossil fuels appear cheaper by shifting costs onto residents in the form of worse health outcomes and climate-related weather disasters. 

In addition to showing what the energy mix might look like without data centers, the SCC directed Dominion to identify which of its approximately 200 planned transmission projects were needed solely because of data centers. The 4-page table in Dominion’s supplemental filing reveals that about half of the projects are solely data center-driven, with two or three dozen more serving a mix of customers that includes data centers. I tried to add up the numbers but lost track at a billion dollars’ worth of projects needed solely for data centers – and I was still on the second page. 

There is one more caveat to keep in mind. Since the SCC’s order applied only to future growth, Dominion’s new numbers don’t show the cost and energy impact of data centers in operation today. Data centers already make up a quarter of Dominion’s sales, and that growth was the main reason the utility pivoted back to fossil fuels in its 2023 IRP. 

Still, most of the data center growth lies ahead of us, as does Dominion’s plans for new fossil fuel and nuclear generation. With state leaders avidly chasing more data centers in the name of economic development, ordinary Virginians are left to watch the assault on their energy supply, their water, and their environment and wonder: Is anyone going to fix this?

This article was originally published in the Virginia Mercury on November 26, 2024.

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If Dominion’s plan is so bad, is there a better one? (Spoiler alert: yes, there is.)

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Courtesy of Lowell Feld, Blue Virginia

In my last column I took Dominion’s Integrated Resource Plan (semi-) seriously, giving the utility the benefit of the doubt in its projections for data center growth and the alleged need for more fossil fuels to keep up with the power demands of that ravenous industry. But as I also noted, Dominion doesn’t deserve to be taken seriously with this document.

Under Virginia law, an Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) is supposed to explain how the utility expects to meet demand reliably and at low cost within the constraints of the law. In this IRP, however, Dominion asked a different question: how to make Gov. Glenn Youngkin happy by keeping fossil fuels dominant regardless of both law and cost. 

Coming up with a favorable answer required Dominion to ignore the Virginia Clean Economy Act (VCEA), create arbitrary limits on solar deployment, use wishful thinking instead of facts and, for good measure, do basic math wrong. They also assume the Youngkin administration will succeed in pulling Virginia out of the carbon-cutting Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a move that is being challenged in court. This makes Dominion’s IRP, with its plan to double carbon emissions, a sort of evil twin to a plan from any RGGI state. 

Sure enough, the governor loves it. Elsewhere, however, this evil twin found a cold reception. Experts retained by environmental, consumer and industry groups all agree that this IRP should be chucked in the trash bin and Dominion told to start over.

It’s worth taking a look at the testimony from these groups to understand where Dominion went so badly wrong, and what a better plan might look like. 

It’s all about the data centers

Northern Virginia data centers are the driving force behind Dominion’s plans to burn more coal and gas, but there is some disagreement whether their growth will be absolutely off-the-charts crazy, or merely eye-poppingly huge. Dominion’s IRP projects the data center industry’s power use in its territory will quadruple over the next 15 years, rising from 2,767 megawatts (MW) in 2022 to more than 11,000 MW in 2038. At that point it would represent close to 40% of Dominion’s load. 

Experts testifying in the IRP case believe data center demand won’t reach the dizzying heights Dominion projects. They question whether Virginia communities will accept so much new data center development, given the pushback already evident in localities like Prince William and Fauquier Counties. Their thinking is essentially that if things can’t go on this way, they probably won’t.

They also suggest that some of the demand Dominion expects may also be reflected in the plans of other utilities serving Northern Virginia’s Data Center Alley, leading to double-counting. A load forecast published by grid operator PJM shows that Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative (NOVEC) projects its data center demand to rise from about 400 MW in 2022 to 4,000 by 2028 and 8,000 by 2034. Two other cooperatives project a combined 3,000 MW of data center development in the same time period. 

Aside from data centers, demand for electricity in Dominion territory is flat or declining over the next fifteen years; presumably this is due to the increased efficiency of homes and businesses offsetting the increased demand from electric vehicles and building electrification. 

If you were already experiencing vertigo over Dominion’s data center numbers, and you are now hearing for the first time that Dominion’s numbers represent only half of the total projected data center load coming to Virginia, maybe you won’t find it all that cheering that some of that added demand could be illusory. Still, it is a reasonable point. If you reduce demand by a few thousand megawatts here and there, pretty soon you might not “need” a new gas plant.

As an aside, one Virginia utility stands out for apparently not expecting much in the way of new data centers in its territory. Appalachian Power, which serves customers in Southwest Virginia, West Virginia and Tennessee, has experienced declining demand for years, and rural Virginia leaders would dearly love to see data centers come there. Yet the PJM forecast shows Appalachian Power’s parent company, American Electric Power (AEP), told grid operators it expected only about another 200 MW on top of the 500 MW of data center load it serves across its entire 11-state territory. AEP seems to regard this as quite a lot, which, when compared with what is happening in Northern Virginia, seems rather sweet.

I can’t help but wonder how Gov. Youngkin managed to make a deal with Amazon to bring $35 billion worth of new data centers to Virginia without securing a guarantee that many of the facilities would be located in a part of the state that actually has surplus energy capacity and desperately needs new economic development. Southwest Virginia voters may have put Youngkin in office; you’d think he’d be looking out for them.

Instead of real investment today, Youngkin promises the area a little nuclear plant a decade from now, when and if small modular reactors (SMRs) prove viable. Local leaders must be muttering, “Gee, thanks.”

And this leads to another point raised by several of the experts in the IRP case: All of the load growth Dominion projects is due to a single industry in Northern Virginia; elsewhere, demand is decreasing. Yet, instead of crafting a solution specific to the industry and region experiencing runaway growth, Dominion proposes to build a fossil fuel plant 140 miles away in Chesterfield and a nuclear plant 300 miles away in another utility’s territory.

Gregory Abbott, a former SCC Deputy Director, offers a particularly withering assessment of the IRP in his testimony on behalf of environmental advocacy group Appalachian Voices. Dominion’s computer model, he says, “is proposing supply-side solutions that are not focused on solving the actual problem, are likely unnecessary, and driving costs higher than they should be.”

Although Dominion insists this IRP represents just a “snapshot in time,” Abbott says that’s misleading: The IRP “sets the stage for multi-billion-dollar investments that Dominion’s customers will pay for decades to come. If a future snapshot in time changes, based on new public policy goals or market dynamics, ratepayers are stuck with paying for these sunk costs.” 

Garbage in, garbage out

Abbott and others also note that unlike factories or other high consumers of energy, data center operators can shift some functions to other data centers elsewhere for short periods of time. Dominion could save money and reduce the need for new investments by capitalizing on this capability to develop demand-response programs tailored specifically to this industry. 

Instead, Dominion treated the surge in demand as if it were statewide and spread across all its customers; then it used a computer model to figure out how to meet the soaring demand. 

An expert for the Sierra Club, Devi Glick of Synapse Energy Economics, noted several problems with Dominion’s approach. Among them: the company told its computer model that it couldn’t select energy efficiency as a resource; it had to include gas combustion turbines in 2028; it had to adhere to artificial limits on solar, wind and battery storage; and it had to assume prices for solar that were “substantially higher than industry projections.” Dominion also did not instruct the model to account for proposed (and since finalized) new federal pollution limits that will raise the cost of burning fossil fuels, and miscalculated — by a billion dollars — the penalties associated with failure to meet the VCEA’s renewable energy requirements. 

As they say, garbage in, garbage out. The model did what it was told, and produced plans that limited solar and battery storage, called for new gas combustion turbines and/or SMRs, and kept uneconomic coal plants running past their previously-planned retirement dates. Accordingly, none of the modeled scenarios complied with Virginia law and all would be unnecessarily expensive for customers.

Synapse ran its own computer model that kept most of Dominion’s load and cost assumptions but corrected for the company’s errors and artificial constraints. The results, not surprisingly, show that building more solar and storage and retiring coal plants earlier than Dominion wants to will lower carbon emissions and “reduce costs for Dominion’s ratepayers by between $4.1 and $9.0 billion over the 25-year study period.”  

When Synapse then tweaked the model to reflect the new federal pollution rules and prices for solar and battery storage in line with industry projections, the results saw solar and battery investments soaring, while the “need” for firm capacity such as a new gas plant disappeared altogether during the planning period.  

Clean energy, vindicated

So finally, we begin to see a path forward founded on real data and not constrained by political expediency. With none of its plans meeting the basic requirements of Virginia law, Dominion should be ordered to go back to the drawing board. The company should reexamine its data center load projections and design a demand-response program tailored to that industry. Then it should re-run its computer model with energy efficiency allowed as a resource, with no artificial constraints on battery storage and renewable energy,with federal and state compliance costs associated with fossil fuels fully included and with cost estimates for solar and storage consistent with industry norms.   

The General Assembly has a role to play, too, in ensuring the data center industry does not shift costs onto other customers and cause Virginia to fall short of its carbon reduction goals. Data centers should be required to meet energy efficiency targets and to secure an increasing percentage of renewable energy on their own as a condition of obtaining generous state tax subsidies. Likewise, the State Corporation Commission should be required to ensure that data centers pay for the transmission upgrades they need. Finally, the General Assembly should pass the data center study bill adopted by the Senate this year before being killed in the House.

Finally, it’s clear that the computer models will select as much low-cost solar as they are allowed to, so the General Assembly should make it easier to build solar projects at competitive rates. They can do this by further opening the market to third-party developers, who are currently constrained by an interpretation of the VCEA that caps their share of the solar Dominion procures at 35%.

The SCC will hold a hearing on the IRP beginning September 18.

An earlier version of this article appeared in the Virginia Mercury on September 5, 2023.

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Why are Dominion Energy’s customers footing the bill for Virginia’s data center buildout?

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Dominion Energy headquarters, Richmond, VA


Virginia’s embrace of the data center industry produced new fallout this spring when Dominion Energy Virginia released its latest Integrated Resource Plan (IRP). With data center growth the “key driver,” Dominion projects a massive increase in the demand for electricity. As a result, the utility claims the state-mandated transition to clean energy is now impossible to achieve. 

Jettisoning its commitment to the Virginia Clean Economy Act (VCEA), Dominion proposes to keep running uneconomic coal and biomass plants that were previously slated for closure, build a new fossil gas plant and pay penalties instead of meeting state renewable energy targets, all of which mean higher costs for customers.

As I said at the time, this IRP is primarily a political document aimed at currying favor with a gas-loving governor. It is not a serious plan. For example, a Sierra Club filing with the State Corporation Commission describes how Dominion put artificial constraints into its computer modeling (including limits on new solar) to ensure the plan came out fossil-friendly. Moreover, Dominion’s demand projections are inflated, according to the clean energy industry group Advanced Energy United.

But for the sake of discussion, let’s take the IRP at face value. And in that case, I have some questions. How did Dominion let itself get blindsided by the data center growth spurt? Why are the rest of us expected to pay for infrastructure that’s only needed for data centers? Does the Governor understand that his deal to bring another $35 billion worth of new Amazon data centers to Virginia  is driving up energy rates for everyone else? 

Oh, and while I’m at it, are tech company commitments to sourcing renewable energy just a pack of lies?

Virginia’s data center problem is well known. Northern Virginia has the largest concentration of data centers in the world, by far. Data centers are Dominion’s single largest category of commercial power users, already consuming more than 21% of total electricity supply and slated to hit 50% by 2038. In addition to the new generation that will be required, data centers need grid upgrades including new transmission lines, transformers and breakers, with the costs spread to all ratepayers. 

Residents are not happy. Controversy around data centers’ diesel generators, their water use, noise and visual impacts have spread outward from Loudoun County into Prince William, Fauquier, and even other parts of Virginia as massive new developments are proposed. 

Data center developers don’t build without assurance they will have access to the huge amount of electricity they need for their operations, so they have to start discussions with their utility early. Yet in July of 2022, Dominion stunned the data center industry by warning it would not be able to meet new demand in Loudoun County until 2025 or 2026. The utility said, however, that the problem was not generating capacity, but transmission. So, what gives?

Not that it would be better if Dominion anticipated the oncoming tsunami but kept it secret until this spring. You have to wonder whether the General Assembly would have approved hundreds of millions of dollars in grants and tax subsidies for new Amazon data centers in February if legislators understood the effect would be to upend the VCEA and drive up energy costs for residents. 

Some Republicans are no doubt pleased that Dominion’s IRP undermines the VCEA, but they shouldn’t be. Dominion proposes keeping coal plants open not for economic reasons, but in spite of them. These plants were slated for closure in previous IRPs because they were costing ratepayers too much money. Now Dominion says it needs more generating capacity and can’t (or rather, won’t) build enough low-cost solar to keep up with new data center demand.

Dominion also proposes to build a new methane gas combustion “peaker” plant that wasn’t in its last IRP, and again the company points to data center growth as the reason. Peaker plants are an expensive way to generate power; on average, the cost of energy from gas combustion is about double that of a solar/storage combination, or even triple once you factor in federal clean energy incentives.

Keeping the fossil fuel party going instead of embracing more solar isn’t the only way this IRP drives rates higher for customers. Limiting its solar investments means Dominion expects to miss the VCEA’s renewable energy percentage targets by a mile. The shortfall would subject Dominion to significant penalties. The kicker is, Dominion can pass the cost of those penalties  on to ratepayers, too. 

Regardless of your political persuasion, then, this IRP is bad news for Virginia consumers. 

It’s also concerning that the driver of all these higher costs and carbon emissions is the high-tech industry that is so eager to be seen as a leader in sustainability. If these tech companies were meeting their power needs with renewable energy, Dominion wouldn’t be able to claim a “need” to keep its old coal plants belching away.  

Amazon, the number one beneficiary of state data center largesse, says it is the leading corporate purchaser of renewable energy globally. Its website claims the company is “on a path to powering our operations with 100% renewable energy by 2025.” A map shows it has developed around 16 solar projects in Virginia, adding up to over 1,100 megawatts. That’s great, but the company’s Virginia data centers are such energy hogs that they would need many times as much solar, plus a huge amount of battery storage to meet their 24/7 demand. And of course, Amazon’s demand will skyrocket with that next $35 billion in new data centers.

That same map, by the way, shows that Amazon has on-site solar at warehouses and Whole Foods stores all over the Northeast, but none in Virginia. Northeastern states have higher commercial power rates than Virginia does, so on-site solar means bigger bill savings in those states. One cannot help but suspect that Amazon’s commitment to renewable energy is really just a commitment to cheap energy.  

The Data Center Coalition’s filing in the IRP case does nothing to reassure us otherwise. Instead of chiding Dominion for reneging on its clean energy commitments, the Coalition’s Josh Levi essentially argues data centers are so important it doesn’t matter. 

I have no beef with data centers as a general proposition. They are an integral component of today’s economy, and the developments that now drive their explosive growth — machine learning and artificial intelligence — will also help us achieve a zero-carbon future.  

I just think data centers should try a little harder to be part of the solution instead of part of the problem.  

This article was first published in the Virginia Mercury on August 16, 2023.

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Law? What law? Pandering to the governor, Dominion’s new plan ignores Virginia’s climate law

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Dominion Energy headquarters, Richmond, VA

Last December, Dominion Energy produced a remarkable document: a climate report predicting that by 2040 its electricity supply will be dominated by renewable energy. Coal will be gone by 2030, and methane gas will hang around in ever-smaller amounts, just to fill in the energy gaps. Small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) probably won’t play a role for at least 15 years, during which time solar will become the mainstay of the electricity supply. According to the report, this strategy will allow Dominion to meet its goal of becoming carbon-neutral by 2050.  

Fast forward a few months, and the same company, using the same information, projects a future full of new methane-burning plants and SMRs. Dominion Energy Virginia’s 2023 Integrated Resource Plan (IRP), released May 1, now insists that the phenomenal growth of the data center industry and, to a lesser degree, the adoption of electric vehicles require so much energy that it can’t possibly meet legally-mandated climate goals. Accordingly, the plan doesn’t even try.

Instead of decarbonizing in accordance with Virginia’s role in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the requirements of the Virginia Clean Economy Act (VCEA), Dominion now says it must build new methane-burning plants and keep old, expensive coal plants running “beyond statutory retirement deadlines established in the VCEA.”  All the alternatives examined in the IRP “assume that Virginia exits the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (‘RGGI’) before January 1, 2024,” in violation of Virginia law. Most of the alternatives include the same SMRs its Climate Report recognized as unready. Compared to Dominion’s 2022 IRP update (filed just last September!), now costs have ballooned and CO2 emissions will skyrocket. 

What could possibly have happened in the course of a few months to produce this about-face? The astounding growth projections for the data center industry may be news to many Virginians, but not to the utility that provides their power. Vehicle electrification is hardly a surprise either. SMRs did not achieve any breakthroughs in technology or economics this winter, nor did anyone suddenly discover a way for new gas plants to make sense for the climate or ratepayers. Dominion makes a big deal out of the Christmas cold snap, but you have to try pretty hard to believe that requires upending all previous planning.

What did happen was the 2023 General Assembly session, in which Gov. Glenn Youngkin played a decisive role in handing Dominion a major – and unaccustomed – defeat. With Dominion Energy holding its shareholder meeting today, the company badly needs to show it is back in the governor’s good graces. And the governor, as we know, is not a fan of the energy transition. 

In other words, the IRP is a political document, not a serious approach to meeting Virginia’s electricity needs, at a time when climate change is accelerating and fossil fuels are giving way to superior renewable energy technologies.  

Market watchers will recall that Dominion’s stock price tanked in the fall of 2022, losing more than 30% of its value from August to November. So the company came up with a bill that would have increased the profit margin for its Virginia utility from 9.35% to 10.77%. This number was calculated to improve Dominion’s standing on Wall Street but would cost consumers an extra $4 billion, according to the State Corporation Commission’s estimate. The company also expected to be able to defeat pro-consumer legislation that would return more authority over rates to the SCC.

Dominion’s bill was widely panned, but that hardly made it a non-starter. In past years, the company has gotten what it wanted more often than not, thanks to powerful friends like Senate Majority Leader Dick Saslaw, D-Fairfax, and House Majority Leader Terry Kilgore, R-Scott. This is the beauty of doing business in a state that allows corporations, even public utilities, to supply unlimited campaign donations to elected officials. Over the years, Dominion’s contributions to Republican Kilgore nearly match its contributions to Democrat Saslaw. Most other General Assembly members get contributions from Dominion, too, helping to cement bipartisan support for the company’s priorities.

As the patrons of this year’s money bill, Saslaw and Kilgore should have been able to deliver enough votes from members of both parties to ensure a profitable outcome for their biggest campaign donor. They were not counting on the governor poking holes in the plan. 

Dominion’s beating this year grew from seeds it sowed in 2021. That year, Dominion made a bad bet on Democrat Terry MacAuliffe to win the governorship, secretly funding a dark money group to run ads attacking Youngkin. 

This year, Youngkin took his revenge. As a Wall Street guy himself, he knows how to hit a corporation where it hurts. 

Youngkin forced Dominion to accept changes to the bill that increase the company’s return on equity modestly (and only temporarily), but take away other avenues of profit. Adding insult to injury, the General Assembly also adopted the pro-consumer legislation that allows the SCC to set “fair and reasonable” rates in the future. 

Dominion declared itself satisfied with the result, but Wall Street judged otherwise. The company’s stock, which had started to rally in January, reached a ten-year low this spring. 

Aside from punishing Dominion, the governor achieved none of his energy goals in the legislative session. Rolling back the VCEA, exiting RGGI through legislation, reversing the Clean Car Standard — none of that happened. And as long as the Democrats keep control of at least one chamber in the General Assembly in this fall’s election, none of that is likely to happen. 

So Dominion’s IRP violates Virginia’s laws and the public’s trust (such as it is), makes a mockery of its own climate plan and proposes “solutions” that will drive up both costs and carbon emissions. As a plan, it can’t be taken seriously.  

All that, however, is beside the point. It makes the governor happy. And what makes the governor happy, Dominion hopes, will make its shareholders happy. 

That assumes the shareholders don’t care about climate change, or that they hold values that are as malleable as those of Dominion CEO Bob Blue and the rest of the company’s leadership. 

Climate change? What climate change?

An earlier version of this article was published in the Virginia Mercury on May 10, 2023.

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The facts about coal plants Dominion didn’t want you to know

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smokestack

Photo credit Stiller Beobachter

Last winter, during the fight to pass the Virginia Clean Economy Act, Dominion Energy lobbyists went out of their way to save the company’s youngest coal plant in Wise County. It worked. Legislators exempted the Virginia City Hybrid Energy Center from closure until 2045, when Dominion has to shutter all its fossil fuel generation.

VCHEC was approved in 2008 and built in 2013 as a boondoggle for Dominion, earning the company an enhanced rate of return. It was also intended as an expensive gift from then-Gov. Tim Kaine to coalfield Democrats, who went on to lose their seats anyway. Even then, it was a terrible deal for Dominion’s customers and the climate, with all the carbon pollution you expect from coal and a cost that was twice that of cleaner alternatives.

No wonder it proved to be one of the last coal plants ever built in the U.S.

Knowing this, and knowing the determination of this year’s General Assembly to turn the commonwealth in the direction of clean energy, you might not have expected VCHEC to have a lot of friends left in Richmond. But Dominion never told legislators what it would cost consumers to keep its coal plants running. Among all the criticism of the price tag associated with Virginia’s energy transition — much of that criticism coming from Dominion itself — one crucial fact gets lost: It’s coal that is hitting consumers the hardest.

An analysis Dominion reluctantly made public last month as part of its Integrated Resource Planning case shows that VCHEC is far and away the worst performing economically of all the utility’s fossil fuel-burning plants. This one coal plant carries a 10-year net present value of negative $472 million. (The analysts didn’t extend their calculations out to 2045, where it would certainly cross a billion dollars; maybe they were running low on red ink.)

VCHEC isn’t the only coal plant in Dominion’s fleet with a negative valuation, just the worst. In fact, all the Virginia coal plants have negative values.

These are Dominion’s numbers, not those of the Sierra Club or the other environmental and consumer groups challenging Dominion’s plans. The Sierra Club hired a consulting company to run its own analysis, using a standard utility model. That analysis concluded it would be cheaper for customers to build more solar now and speed up the closure not just of VCHEC but of all Dominion’s coal plants. This includes even the company’s Mount Storm coal plant in West Virginia, the only one assigned a positive economic value in Dominion’s analysis. From a customer standpoint, all of them should go.

Maybe that’s not too surprising. We already knew coal was dead. But how many of us knew we were paying to prop up the corpse?

Dominion’s lawyers tried to keep the terrible cost numbers out of the public’s hands, contending it was “confidential commercial and financial information that other entities could use to their competitive advantage in future negotiations.” I can imagine these future meetings: the other entities would be so busy mocking Dominion that, indeed, negotiations might stall permanently.

Fortunately for all of us, the Attorney General’s Office of Consumer Counsel persuaded the SCC the information should be public. Some information truly is confidential; this is merely embarrassing. Dominion’s customers—and the General Assembly—should know what it’s costing us to prop up coal.

This article originally appeared in the Virginia Mercury on September 24, 2020.

The analysis Dominion ultimately produced, showing 10-year Net Present Values for certain of its generating units, under various scenarios. Notice biomass doesn’t do too well either. The analysis omits some additional units, apparently because they are already scheduled for retirement.

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What part of ‘zero’ doesn’t Dominion understand?

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Photo courtesy os the Sierra Club.

The more things change, the more they stay the same.

Dominion Energy Virginia filed its 2020 Integrated Resource Plan on May 1. Instead of charting the electric utility’s pathway to zero carbon emissions, it announced its intent to hang on to all its gas plants, and even add to the number. In doing so, it revealed a company so thoroughly wedded to fracked gas that it would rather flout Virginia law and risk its own future than do the hard work of transforming itself.

The Virginia Clean Economy Act may be new, but Dominion can hardly claim to be surprised by the commonwealth’s move away from fossil fuels. Gov. Ralph Northam’s executive order last September set a statewide target of zero carbon emissions from the electric sector by 2050. “Challenge accepted,” said a Dominion spokesman at the time, and in February of this year the company claimed it was embracing a 2050 net-zero-carbon goal company-wide. A month later, passage of the Clean Economy Act moved the deadline up to 2045 for Dominion, keeping it at 2050 for utilities that lack Dominion’s head start of 30 percent nuclear power.

Dominion’s IRP, however, does not accept the challenge to get off fossil fuels. It rejects the challenge, directing a giant middle finger at the governor and the General Assembly. Dominion’s “preferred” plan keeps the utility’s existing fracked gas generating plants — currently 40 percent of its electric generation — operating through 2045. The IRP acknowledges this violates the law, so it argues against the law.

The IRP posits that if Dominion stops burning gas in Virginia, it will instead simply buy electricity from out of state, some of which will be generated by gas, and this will cost more money without reducing carbon emissions at the regional level. Better, then, to keep burning gas in Virginia.

It gets worse. The IRP actually proposes increasing the number of gas combustion turbines in Dominion’s fleet. The VCEA imposes a two-year moratorium on new fossil fuel plants, so Dominion’s timetable has these gas peaker plants coming online in 2023 and 2024. The justification is vague; the IRP cites “probable” reliability problems related to adding a lot of solar, but it offers no analysis to back this up, much less any discussion of non-gas alternatives.

Dominion’s flat-out refusal to abandon gas by 2045 poisons the rest of the document. The IRP is supposed to show a utility’s plans over a 15-year period, in this case up to 2035. And for those years, the IRP includes the elements of the VCEA that make money for Dominion: the build-out of solar, offshore wind and energy storage projects. It also includes money-saving retirements of outmoded coal, oil and biomass plants, as the VCEA requires. Heck, it even includes plans to close a coal plant the VCEA would allow to stay open in spite of its poor economic outlook (the Clover plant, half-owned by Old Dominion Electric Cooperative.)

But the IRP proposes no energy efficiency measures beyond those mandated by the VCEA between now and 2025. Dominion hates energy efficiency; it reduces demand, which is bad for business. So the company has made no effort to think deeply about how energy efficiency and other demand-side measures can support a zero-carbon grid — or, for that matter, how customer-owned solar can be made a part of the solution, rather than part of the problem.

This isn’t surprising: a plan that contemplates keeping gas plants around indefinitely looks very different, even in the first 15 years, from a plan that closes them all within 10 years after that.

A company that really accepted the challenge of creating a zero-carbon energy supply would not just get creative in its own planning; it would look beyond generating and supplying electricity, at the larger universe of solutions. It would advocate for buildings constructed to need much less energy, including for heating and cooling, to lessen the seasonal peaks in energy demand.

It would want the state to embrace strong efficiency standards. It would press its corporate and institutional customers to upgrade their facilities and operations to save energy, especially at times of peak demand. It would partner with communities to create microgrids. It would invest in innovation.

In short, it would ask “How can we achieve our fossil-free goal?” instead of asking “How can we keep burning gas?”

It’s not hard to understand why Dominion clings to gas; its parent company is fighting desperately to keep the Atlantic Coast Pipeline project alive in the face of spiraling costs (now up to $8 billion), an increasingly uphill battle at the State Corporation Commission to stick utility ratepayers with the costs of a redundant gas supply contract and a dearth of other customers anywhere along the route.

What is really hard to understand, though, is why Dominion chose to be quite so transparent in its disdain for the VCEA. Senator Jennifer McClellan and Delegate Rip Sullivan, both Democrats, who introduced the law and negotiated its terms with Dominion lobbyists and other stakeholders through many long days and nights, reacted to the IRP with entirely predictable outrage. In a statement they responded:

“The VCEA requires Virginia utilities to step up to the plate and be active leaders in carbon reduction. Dominion Energy’s IRP is tantamount to quitting the game before the first pitch is thrown. The law sets clear benchmarks for Virginia to reach 100 percent clean energy by 2045, not for utilities to plan to import carbon-polluting energy from West Virginia or Kentucky.”

Senator McClellan, it might be pointed out, could be on her way to becoming Virginia’s next governor. Most companies would hesitate to offend a leader of her stature, as well as such a prominent Democratic leader as Delegate Sullivan.

A growing number of legislators also seem interested in ending Dominion’s monopoly and bringing retail choice to Virginia. Though the bill that would have done that didn’t make it out of committee this year, the high-handed tone of the IRP will push more legislators into the anti-monopoly camp.

Arrogance and complacency seem like dangerous traits in times like these, but that’s Dominion for you. It will rise to any challenge, as long as the challenge doesn’t require anything the company didn’t already want to do.

A version of this article appeared in the Virginia Mercury on May 14, 2020.

Want a better understanding of how this year’s legislation works? I’m presenting the ins and outs of over a dozen bills in these three webinars:

  • What to expect when you’re expecting an energy transition, May 14, 2020 (recording available here)
  • New solar opportunities for homeowners, businesses and nonprofits, May 21, 2020, 5:30 p.m., register here
  • New tools for local governments to cut carbon, May 28, 2020, 5:30 p.m., register here
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Ignoring state climate rules, Dominion decides what carbon regulations should look like

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woman in dinosaur costume holding sign reading clean energy now

Four out of five dinosaurs agree. The fifth, that would be Dominion. Photo courtesy of Sierra Club Virginia Chapter.

For several years now, Dominion Energy Virginia has factored into its plans an assumption that electricity from carbon-emitting power plants will eventually include a cost reflecting CO2’s role as the primary driver of global warming. Dominion says it has even integrated this into its corporate goals, targeting an 80 percent reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050.

That promise may be more propaganda than corporate lodestar, but in any case the utility’s Integrated Resource Plans regularly point to the probability of future carbon regulations as a reason to build new renewable energy facilities and close old coal plants.

Planning for constraints on CO2 emissions proved wise this spring when Virginia’s Department of Environmental Quality finalized a state carbon cap-and-trade program. The DEQ regulations call for Virginia power plant owners to trade carbon allowances with those in the member states of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). A Republican budget maneuver has delayed implementation of the new rules, but once they take effect they are expected to hasten the retirement of expensive old coal plants and support investments in new renewable energy projects.

But it’s not the DEQ regulations that Dominion is planning around. The utility’s 2019 update to its 2018 IRP, filed with the State Corporation Commission on Aug. 29, treats the DEQ regulations as hypothetical. Instead, it posits some unspecified future federal carbon regulations that, apparently, it would like much better.

The update describes three alternative scenarios, down from five in the 2018 IRP. The first is a “base case” that assumes no carbon emission constraints. The second assumes the state carbon limits take effect as well as some future federal regulations, and the third assumes federal (but not state) limits. However, the cover letter makes it clear that only the third scenario actually describes what Dominion intends to do. As it happens, that is the most expensive— and most profitable —plan.

The primary feature of the base case is that it keeps some old coal units running that will be closed in the other scenarios. According to Dominion, this makes it the least-cost approach to meeting electricity demand. Whether that’s true is a matter of dispute; these units hardly run at all any more, and experts for environmental organizations in the IRP hearing testified that retiring them will save money for customers.

It suits Dominion’s political strategy, however, to pretend that coal remains a low-cost option. This fiction makes coalfield legislators happy, and it allows Dominion to blame rising electricity rates on environmental regulations instead of on its own profligate spending and excess profits.

But Dominion Energy made a big bet on fracked gas, not coal. It won’t fight to keep outdated coal plants online and spewing out CO2 if it’s cheaper to close them. Gas plants are another matter. Dominion Energy’s massive investments in gas transmission and storage make the company keen to keep Virginia gas plants running full-tilt, and to build as much new gas generation as possible.

For that reason, Dominion hates the DEQ regulations. It warns the regional cap and trade plan will result in power from outside the state replacing electricity from Dominion’s combined-cycle gas plants, which provide baseload power. Dominion argues this will lead to higher, rather than lower, carbon emissions as well as higher consumer costs.

DEQ and others disagree on both counts, though the SCC takes Dominion’s view. So although Dominion labels its second scenario RGGI-compliant, it treats the DEQ regulations as hypothetical, as if Gov. Ralph Northam might change his mind any day now and order them scrapped.

Instead, Dominion offers its third scenario, positing only unspecified and (with Trump as president) truly hypothetical future federal carbon regulations. In Dominion’s fantasy, a federal plan will be strong enough to support Dominion building profitable new renewable energy and storage projects, but not so strong that it can’t also build a bunch of new gas plants.

Ergo, that’s what Dominion is shooting for. The cover letter accompanying the IRP update makes it clear that Dominion is already pursuing projects that appear only in the third plan. These include a 300 MW pumped hydro storage project that will take a decade to develop and cost upwards of $1.5 billion (if indeed it pans out), and an 852 MW offshore wind project slated for 2025, a year later than what Dominion told investors in March.

The third scenario also includes more than 3,000 MW of solar between now and the end of 2034, but that’s actually a whole lot less solar than under the RGGI scenario. Even the base case has more solar. Go figure.

Still missing is the rest of the 2,000 MW of offshore wind that the Virginia lease area can support. Also still missing are thousands more megawatts of wind and solar that Virginia would need if, instead of a gas-friendly plan, the federal government were to enact regulations actually sufficient to the climate crisis.

Dominion has not even modeled that possibility. The update’s third scenario still includes 10 new fracked-gas combustion turbines, a total of 2,425 MW, with two units coming online every year from 2022 through 2026.

Maybe the Dominion executive team thinks it knows more than the rest of us do about the federal climate plan we’ll see once Donald Trump is sent packing in 2020. More likely, Dominion is simply using its IRP carbon assumptions to bolster its case for more spending and higher profits.

In which case, the more things get updated, the more they stay the same.

 

This article originally appeared in the Virginia Mercury on September 13, 2019.

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At long last, Dominion decides it’s game on for offshore wind

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Offshore wind turbines

The Block Island wind farm in Rhode Island. Photo by Ionna22 via Wikimedia Commons.

When utility regulators gave Dominion Energy Virginia the go-ahead to build two offshore wind turbines last November, it was still unclear whether the pilot project might be the end as well as the beginning of offshore wind in Virginia.

Now, however, Dominion seems to have decided it’s game on. Although the company hasn’t issued any public statements about its intentions, its presentation to investors in March included $880 million in spending on offshore wind through 2023, over and above the cost of the pilot project.

This came as a surprise to everyone, including Virginia regulators at the State Corporation Commission. Commissioners were not pleased that Wall Street heard the utility’s plans before they did. Dominion’s 2018 Integrated Resource Plan did not propose building a full-sized offshore wind farm any time in the next 15 years.

Nor had the 2016 and 2017 IRPs, even though the company has been sitting on a lease for an area of ocean that could provide at least 2,000 megawatts of offshore wind power, enough for 500,000 homes.

At a hearing on the IRP this month, the company promised regulators it would submit detailed information in its future filings, and confirmed that it currently has its sights set on 2024 for the first commercial wind farm.

For now, however, Dominion remains focused on getting the two test turbines up and running in a state-held lease area 24 miles out to sea from Virginia Beach. If all goes according to plan, the Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind project will be up and running by late summer 2020.

The two, 6-MW turbines will contribute only enough electricity to the grid for about 3,000 homes, but they will be the first turbines in federal waters anywhere in the U.S.  (The nation’s first wind farm, off Block Island in Rhode Island, is closer to shore in state waters.)

With that finish line in sight, state officials, developers, business people and offshore wind researchers were at Old Dominion University in Norfolk Tuesday night to share their vision of how Virginia will leverage its baby steps into a multi-billion-dollar industry that could “reinvent” Hampton Roads.

The town hall forum, organized by the Sierra Club, emphasized the workforce, supply chain and port opportunities if Virginia succeeds in becoming a commercial hub for offshore wind farms all along the East Coast. Gov. Ralph Northam’s administration hopes to find success with this plan even if Virginia lags other states in building wind farms.

Thomas Brostrøm, president of Ørsted North America, the Danish developer that is partnering with Dominion to build its pilot, described the size of the opportunity. The “pipeline” for projects in the U.S. has now reached 20,000 MW, mostly in New England, New York, New Jersey and Maryland. A buildout of 1,000 to 1,500 MW per year is enough to support a U.S.-based supply chain, he said. This is important not just for American businesses but also for customers, since local manufacturing means lower costs.

Brostrøm also agreed with elected leaders and port officials at the forum that Virginia’s deep-water port and unobstructed access to open ocean makes it a particularly attractive base of operations for an industry that has to transport turbine blades the length of football fields.

According to Jennifer Palestrant, director of the SMART Center for Maritime and Transportation at Tidewater Community College, the area’s ability to provide a workforce and job training needed for the new industry is also a given.

“Virginia has been building ships for 300 years,” she told the audience. “We’ve got this.” Workforce training “is in the bag.”

No doubt Virginia’s port and workforce advantages merit this home-state boosterism, but leaders in other states make similar claims. Those states also aren’t leaving anything to chance; while dangling subsidies for offshore wind energy, they are requiring developers to work with local communities and businesses.

Dominion’s decision on whether and when to move forward with a commercial wind farm will thus have a huge impact on how much of the industry Hampton Roads can attract. Mark Mitchell, the company’s director of generation projects, told the town hall audience that one of the most important pieces of information the company wants to gain from CVOW is the capacity factor of the turbines — that is, how much electricity they produce as a percentage of their full “nameplate” capacity.

Currently Dominion expects the test turbines to perform at a capacity factor of 42%. If the turbines do better than that, it means they can produce electricity at lower cost. If they perform less well, costs will be higher. Virginia is at a disadvantage compared to states further north, where stronger winds drive higher capacity factors. And with lower energy prices overall than northeastern states and no subsidies to offer, getting offshore wind to pencil out here is harder.

But Mitchell sounded confident about the future of the industry in Virginia.  As Dominion sees it, he said, offshore wind is important for achieving carbon reductions, and it complements solar “without solar’s land-use issues.” By 2024, he projects costs will fall enough to make an offshore wind farm attractive. “We see the economics coming in to support that,” he said.

This is wonderful news, and also a sudden and remarkable about face for a company that has worked at a snail’s pace since winning the development rights to the Virginia lease six years ago. Other states started later and are on track to finish earlier.

From this we draw two conclusions, one surprising and the other, not so much. First, IRPs are meaningless. Far from revealing the utility’s plans for 15 years, they don’t even tell the SCC what Dominion is thinking at that very moment.  Eat your hearts out, commissioners; to this company, you are irrelevant.

And, more obviously, Dominion follows the money. None of the reasons Virginians want offshore wind — clean energy, jobs, business development, climate mitigation — mattered until a pathway to profit opened up.

No doubt Dominion needs a new profit center. For years the company expected wealth to flow from a planned $19 billion nuclear reactor at North Anna, until the economics grew from challenging to impossible. Currently it’s gambling on the $7 billion-plus Atlantic Coast Pipeline, which is facing a similar cost spiral amid a morass of lawsuits and unresolved questions of whether it has any real customers.

Offshore wind offers an entirely new business opportunity with almost unlimited potential, and one with the added benefit of working with, not against, public opinion and advances in clean energy technology.

Building a commercial wind farm in Virginia may be just the beginning for Dominion. An industry source told me the utility’s parent company, Dominion Energy, is negotiating to buy a $400 million, offshore wind turbine installation vessel.

If true, investing in one of these specialized ships could be a canny business move, since the offshore wind industry is facing a severe shortage of them worldwide, and the U.S. currently has none at all. The purchase would indicate Dominion sees an opportunity to make money on the booming offshore wind market in the Northeast, regardless of what happens in Virginia.

Before the town hall, I asked Dominion for confirmation of its plans and received this response:

“Onshore construction activities associated with CVOW are slated to begin soon.  Additionally, the company is in the early phases of developing a construction operations plan for the larger commercial lease area and expects to have a high-level timeline soon.

“As the first approved offshore wind project in federal waters, CVOW has already provided many valuable lessons learned which will ultimately benefit our customers and the environment as we move through the dozens of required surveys, reports and assessments as part of the construction operation plan for larger scale development. Mark [Mitchell] will provide remarks next week [i.e., at the Sierra Club town hall] and we will share additional information as it becomes available.”

If this seems like disappointingly little information, take heart: you now know at least as much about Dominion’s offshore wind plans as the SCC does.

This article first appeared in the Virginia Mercury on May 30, 2019. 

 

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A revised generation plan leaves Dominion’s case for its pipeline in shambles

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In December of last year, regulators at the State Corporation Commission (SCC) took the unprecedented step of rejecting Dominion Energy Virginia’s Integrated Resource Plan (IRP). Among other reasons, the SCC said the utility had over-inflated projections of how much electricity its customers would use in the future.

On March 8, Dominion came back with a revised plan. And sure enough, when it plugged in the more realistic demand projections used by independent grid operator PJM, and accounted for some energy efficiency savings, the number of new gas plants it planned for dropped in half. Instead of 8-13 new gas combustion turbines, the revised plan listed only 4-7 of these small “peaker” units.

Yet there is a good chance Dominion is still overinflating its demand numbers.  Although the re-filed IRP is short and vague, it appears Dominion isn’t figuring in the full amount of the energy efficiency programs it must develop under legislation passed last year.

SB 966 required Dominion to propose $870 million in energy efficiency and demand-response programs designed to reduce energy use and the need for new generation. But Dominion has proposed just $118 million in its separate demand-side management filing (case PUR-2018-00168).

Moreover, the company has concocted a theory whereby it can satisfy that $870 million requirement by spending just 40 or 50 percent of it and pocketing the rest. In its DSM case Dominion argues that since the Virginia Code allows a utility to recover lost revenue resulting from energy efficiency savings, it can simply reduce the required spending by the amount of lost revenue it anticipates.

It’s a great theory, and suffers only from being wrong. (Oh, and also from infuriating legislators, energy efficiency advocates, and pretty much everyone else who was involved in crafting SB 966.)

It also indicates that Dominion’s demand figures in the IRP are based on plans to spend just a fraction of the $870 million in energy efficiency, achieving much less demand reduction than backers of the law envisioned.

If the SCC decides Dominion can’t withhold hundreds of millions of dollars in efficiency spending, that additional spending will have to be factored into demand projections. Thus the IRP’s demand projection can only go down—and with it, the number of gas plants that might be “needed.”

And yet even the resulting number is likely too high. Several of Dominion’s large corporate customers have been trying to leave its fond embrace to seek better renewable energy offerings elsewhere. (The SCC recently rejected Walmart’s effort to defect.) If they were allowed to leave, how much would that further reduce the need for new generation?

For that matter, those customers and many others, including many of the tech companies responsible for what demand growth there is, say they want renewable energy, not fossil fuels. Dominion claims the renewable generation will have to be backed by gas peaker plants, but energy storage would serve the same purpose and further reduce the need for gas. The SCC will rule on that question when—and if—Dominion ever requests permission to build one of those peakers. It is possible the utility will never build another gas plant.

That’s bad news for Dominion Energy’s other line of business, gas transmission and storage. With demand for new gas generation falling off a cliff, Dominion’s ability to rely on its customer base as an anchor client for the Atlantic Coast Pipeline becomes increasingly doubtful.

Dominion may actually have conceded as much in its re-filed IRP. In response to the SCC’s order that Dominion include pipeline costs in its modeling of the costs of gas generation, Dominion merely stated, without discussion, that it is using the tariff of the pipeline owned by the ACP’s competitor Transco, which supplies gas to Dominion’s existing plants.

This statement continues a pattern of Dominion avoiding any mention of the ACP in SCC proceedings, lest it invite hard questions. But Dominion can’t have it both ways. If it will use Transco, it doesn’t need the ACP. If it plans to use the much more expensive ACP and just isn’t saying so, it has lowballed the cost of gas generation and is misleading the SCC.

This is unfair to customers, and it may backfire on Dominion. The ACP received its federal permit on the strength of contracts with affiliate utilities, but Dominion hasn’t yet asked the SCC to approve the deal. Leaving the ACP out of the discussion in the IRP year after year makes it harder to win approval. When and if the company finally asks the SCC for permission to (over)charge ratepayers for its contract with the ACP, it will not have built any kind of a case for a public need or benefit.

This is not just a risk that Dominion Energy chose to take, it is a risk of the company’s own creation. It defied the Sierra Club’s efforts to have the SCC review the ACP contract early on, knowing it would face vigorous opposition from critics. But since then, its chances for approval have only gotten worse. Back then, the pipeline cost estimate came in at $3 billion less than it is today, Dominion Virginia Power was halfway through a massive buildout of combined-cycle gas plants, and the IRP included several more big, new, gas-hungry combined-cycle plants.

Now the ACP’s cost has climbed above $7 billion and may go as high as $7.75 billion, excluding financing costs, CEO Tom Farrell told investors last month in an earnings call. Meanwhile, the IRP includes an ever-shrinking number of gas plants, to be served by a different pipeline.

One investment management company told clients in January the spiraling price tag may make the ACP uncompetitive with existing pipelines. And Farrell faced a host of cost-related questions in his call with investors.

But Farrell downplayed the risk when it came to a question from Deutsche Bank about the need for SCC approval. Managing Director Jonathan Arnold asked, “On ACP, when you guys are talking about customers, does that include the anchor utility customers, your affiliate customers? Does whatever you’re going to negotiate with them need to be approved by the state regulatory bodies?”

Farrell’s answer sounds nonchalant. “In Virginia, it’s like any other part of our fuel clause. It will be part of the fuel clause case in 2021 or 2022 along with all the other ins and outs of our fuel clause.”

Oh, Mr. Farrell, it is not going to be that easy.

An earlier version of this article first appeared in the Virginia Mercury on March 20, 2019.