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What the heck is a REC? Renewable Electricity Certificates, Renewable Portfolio Standards, and why it all matters anyway

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More than 30 states have Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) to increase the amount of renewable energy their residents use. Renewable energy does not always cost more than conventional energy, but when it does, renewable energy certificates (RECs) may provide the means for making up the cost difference. Whether RPS laws work well, or whether they cost their residents money without providing a value, depends on how well the laws are written. Policy makers, industry watchdogs, and the public all need a basic understanding of how RPS laws and the REC markets work to ensure that the laws are actually serving the public.

So what the heck is a REC?

“REC” stands for “renewable energy certificate.” A REC is a way to monetize the environmental attributes of energy from a renewable resource, so the extra value can be bought and sold independent of the electrons that form the energy itself.

We’ll use an example to make it easier to understand. Say you want to put solar panels on your roof, but you can’t because your house is shaded by tall trees. So you go to your neighbor with the sunny location next door and tell her that if she will put solar panels on her roof, you will buy the electricity from her. You work out a deal, call a solar installer, and soon she’s got a solar array that produces, on average, exactly the amount of electricity your house uses. [1]

As it happens, though, you can’t buy the actual solar energy her panels are producing. That electricity is powering her house, and any excess electricity is feeding into the grid through her meter. Once power is in the grid, it’s all just electrons. The electrons don’t look different whether they come from a coal plant or a wind farm or a solar array. So there is no way to identify and claim the specific electrons that come on the grid from specific solar panels.

What you can buy from your neighbor is the right to say you’re running your house on solar energy, up to whatever amount of power her solar panels produce. This is the essence of a renewable energy certificate. A REC doesn’t represent electricity, but rather the extra value to society of that electricity having been produced by solar panels. So you continue to buy your electricity off the grid from your utility, and then you pay your neighbor something extra for the RECs. You are not actually using solar power, but you are paying for the right to say you are.

Chances are, there won’t be any actual paper certificates involved. You will simply have a contract with your neighbor that states how much you’re paying her per kilowatt-hour. Your contract would also prevent her from making the same deal with any other neighbor, double-dipping by selling the RECs twice.

It is a short step from there to creating a whole market for RECs as a commodity. If you were to stop buying your neighbor’s RECs, she could sell them to someone else, perhaps a “green” business that wanted to say it was running its store on solar power. The price would depend on supply and demand for renewable energy in your area.

What’s a REC got to do with an RPS?

Now let’s scale up our example and add utilities to the story. Your state, it turns out, has a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), a law that tells utilities that they must obtain a certain percentage of their power from renewable sources. Utilities that own their own generation sources may choose to invest in wind, solar, biomass, or other renewable generation facilities, depending on what the law defines as renewable. Utilities that don’t own their own generation, or that can’t produce enough renewable electricity, have to buy that power from others.

This is where RECs come in. When the utility offers to buy renewable power from someone who is generating it, it will want to buy the RECs as well. Buying the RECs allows the utility to demonstrate its compliance with RPS targets. Indeed, in some states, RECs are the only measure of compliance.

If the utility has to go beyond its own service area to find enough renewable energy, the RECs can take on a life of their own as they get bought and sold independently of the power generated. If the state RPS law allows it, a utility could even buy RECs from a renewable power facility that isn’t part of the same regional transmission grid. In that case, the facility sells the power to its local utility, and sells the RECs to the utility that needs them for its RPS obligations. There is no longer any connection between the electricity and its renewable attributes.

The problem with separating RECs from the energy itself

The REC market is important for making an RPS work, and it makes sense when the power generated is within the state that sets the RPS. But when a utility goes beyond the borders of a state, or even of its own service area, to buy RECs, the usefulness of the program to ratepayers declines, and the likelihood of double-counting and confusion increases.

Let’s go back to our example of the two houses. You have a contract with your neighbor to buy the RECs from her solar panels. Buying the RECs gives you the right to say you are powering your home with solar power. But here’s the rub: now that you’ve bought her RECs, she doesn’t have the right to say she is powering her home with solar, even though the panels are on her house. After all, you can’t both claim the same solar power, right?

You can see how easy it would be for double-counting to occur. She has the solar panels, you have the RECs, but there’s only one house’s worth of solar being produced.

Now let’s scale up again to the utility level, where it can get really weird. No two states have the same RPS laws. Some states have strict requirements for what counts as renewable, some have looser requirements, and some have no RPS at all. Utilities want to spend as little as possible to meet their requirements, so they may buy and sell RECs to make sure that the most expensive RECs (usually from solar power) are being used to meet only the toughest standards. If a state doesn’t have a minimum requirement for solar, the utility will try to sell any solar RECs it’s holding to a utility in another state that requires solar, and then buy cheaper RECs (perhaps from landfill gas or older hydroelectric projects) to satisfy its own state’s less-stringent requirements.

The result is just like the example of the two houses: a utility might own a big wind farm or a giant solar array, but if the state has no RPS or only a weak one, it will sell the RECs from that wind or solar facility to utilities in states that do have strong RPS laws. The utility that buys the RECs buys the right to claim that it is providing its customers with renewable energy. The utility that sells the RECs has sold the right to make that same claim. It may own a wind farm, and power from it may flow through its wires, but legally, it’s just selling electrons.

This is not just a theoretical problem. Dominion Virginia Power does precisely this when it advertises its West Virginia wind farms as producing power for Virginia. In fact, it sells the RECs to utilities in other states that have tougher RPS laws than Virginia’s. In this case, Virginia is getting neither the benefit of the wind jobs nor the right to say it is using renewable energy.  Meanwhile, the ratepayers in the state with the tougher RPS, who pay for those RECs, are getting the bragging rights and paying the bill, but they are not seeing the clean energy jobs that the RPS incentivizes. Only West Virginia gets those jobs, along with the actual wind farms.

The ratepayers are like the owners of the two houses. People in the state where the renewable energy is produced may think they are getting renewable energy, but so do the people in the state whose utility is buying the RECs. Customers in the state with the tough RPS are paying for the renewable energy to be produced, but the benefits—jobs, economic development and cleaner air—go to the state where the project is. They are told they are buying renewable energy, but if they understand what is happening, they might well feel like chumps.

What does a good RPS look like?

The problem we just described is why a well-crafted RPS will limit out-of-state RECs purchased separately from the power itself.[2] It is in the interest of ratepayers to create a market for renewable energy in their own area, so jobs are created close to home, and so nearby dirty energy sources are displaced by clean energy, resulting in healthier air and cleaner streams and rivers.

An effective RPS will also include “carve-outs” (minimum levels) for higher-value types of renewable energy like wind and solar that may cost more to produce than biomass, landfill gas, or hydro. Creating demand for wind and solar supports higher prices and can make a project economically feasible when it wouldn’t be otherwise. Again, stimulating these investments means jobs and economic development in the state as well as cleaner air and water when older, dirtier facilities are shut down.

The worst RPS laws are ones that allow RECs from energy that isn’t really renewable (like coal-bed methane), from projects that don’t actually produce energy (like research and development), or that would be produced anyway (like energy from facilities that pre-date the RPS law). Giving credit for these kinds of power devalues the RECs from new and truly renewable projects and undercuts the economic incentives that can make new investments in renewable energy possible.

What does this mean for policy-makers and the public?

There are two main lessons from all this:

  1. Don’t be fooled by appearances. If your state’s RPS can be met with out-of-state RECs from old hydro plants, don’t assume it’s being met with energy from that new wind farm or utility-scale solar array you’ve been reading about here in your state. Those RECs are being sold somewhere else. The only way to find out what you’re paying for in your state’s RPS is to require your utilities to disclose the sources it is using—and then check.
  1. Looser requirements are not better. A kitchen-sink approach to what qualifies as renewable energy ends up being counter-productive because the cheapest sources will always be chosen over higher-quality projects.

Mandatory vs. voluntary RPS lawsIn most states, the RPS is mandatory; utilities that don’t meet the targets are fined by means of an “alternative compliance payment.” In Virginia, which has a “voluntary” RPS, utilities are free to decide whether they want to participate in the program. There is no fine for failing to meet the goals; instead, utilities are rewarded for meeting them, by being allowed to earn a significantly greater profit on their sales of electricity. Since this means charging ratepayers more, this voluntary RPS will cost ratepayers more than a mandatory RPS for the same amount of renewable energy incentivized.

Virginia’s all-carrot, no-stick approach ensures that no utility declines to participate because it costs them nothing to do so (all the costs of compliance are passed through to the consumers), while generating bonus money. The “voluntary” nature of the program is therefore meaningless—and after all, it is mandatory for the ratepayers.

Conclusion: Caveat ratepayer!

Mandatory RPS laws, requirements that the energy be produced in state or that RECs come “bundled” with the energy they represent, stricter standards for what counts as renewable, and carve-outs for wind and solar all produce the most value for the residents who are paying the bills.

Done right, RPS laws and RECs can lead to more renewable energy, job growth, economic development, and a healthier environment for all. But poorly-crafted laws do a disservice to ratepayers and fail at their central purpose. Policy-makers and the public must act like smart consume

[1] Your neighbor will likely enter into a “net-metering” arrangement with your utility, under which she feeds extra power into the grid on sunny days but draws electricity off the grid at night and on cloudy days. Most states now have laws allowing net-metering, but details differ.

[2] Although states are increasingly limiting their RPS programs to in-state RECs, there is some question whether doing so, at least for mandatory programs, could violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Elefant and Holt, “The Commerce Clause and Implications for State Renewable Portfolio Standard Programs.” Clean Energy States Alliance, March 2011.

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RPS Wars: The Empire Nips Back

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The $76 million rip-offf

For much of the past year, critics have been assailing Dominion Power for its “$76 million rip-off”: a bonus the company claimed for meeting Virginia’s renewable energy goals using old dams, trash and wood, much of it out of state. Environmental groups say Dominion should get a bonus only if the company invests in new wind and solar projects in Virginia. Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli says utilities shouldn’t get bonuses for renewable energy at all.

This month the company finally piped up, appearing to deny all charges.  Ratepayers haven’t had to pay anything, said the carefully-worded response to a media inquiry. Base rates are frozen until December 1, 2013, and its compliance with the renewable energy goal will “be only one of a large number of factors that affect the SCC setting our rates going forward.”

Reporters were left scratching their heads. A year ago the State Corporation Commission, which regulates Virginia utilities, determined that the company has “earned” the $76 million bonus by meeting the absurdly lax terms of the state’s renewable energy law. (See SCC case PUE-2011-00027.)  So if customers aren’t paying, how is Dominion collecting?

But of course, customers are paying, and you can bet Dominion intends to get every dime. To understand how this can happen, imagine that you hire a contractor for a long-term project. You agree to pay her a set amount every month. Out of your payments, the contractor will take her expenses and profit, and when she meets a particular goal, she can take out a bonus as well. At the end of two years, you will recalculate your monthly payments to ensure the contractor recoups anything still owed to her, as well as to cover what she is entitled to going forward—expenses, profit and bonuses—and the work will continue.

This is roughly how electric rates are determined in Virginia (although utility customers’ payments also depend on how much electricity they use). Regulators set the rates, and Dominion takes its expenses and profit, including any bonus, out of the payments it receives from customers. If there is money left over at the end of the rate period, Dominion has to refund 60 percent of the excess to ratepayers. (Why doesn’t the company have to refund the entire overcharge, you ask? Sorry, that’s a different rip-off, and I can handle only one at a time.)

On the other hand, if the rates don’t bring in enough revenue to cover expenses and profit, they will be reset at a higher level for the next rate period. One way or another, the utility get its money.

So Dominion’s lawyerly response to critics turns out to be both correct, and irrelevant.  Utility rates are currently frozen, but that tells us nothing about whether the company is collecting its bonus. And if Dominion does not collect the full $76 million before the end of 2013, it will be one of the “factors that affect the SCC setting our rates going forward.” That is, rates will be set to ensure Dominion collects the full amount.

Sorry, ratepayers. The rip-off continues.

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The case for diversity: natural gas plus renewables

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Natural gas is currently cheap. It’s so cheap right now that some producers are losing money with every cubic foot they pump out of the ground. So what better time to be a buyer, right? That’s the thinking of utilities like Dominion Virginia Power, which plans to shut its oldest, worst-performing coal plants and replace them only with new natural gas-fired electric generation.

In fact, it’s the thinking of utilities across the U.S., many of which are planning the same move. But ratepayers and regulators at Virginia’s State Corporation Commission should insist that Dominion take this opportunity to diversify its fuels. New natural gas generation should be at least evenly balanced with price-stable renewable energy like wind and solar. Here are three reasons why.

Natural gas prices will not stay low. Producers are currently pulling back on production because they can’t afford to lose money selling below their costs. And with utilities rushing to build new gas-fired electric generating plants, demand is set to soar in the coming years. Exports of liquid natural gas (LNG) will also serve new markets overseas, where gas prices are much higher than in the U.S., further pushing up demand here. Finally, with the price of oil about 10 times the current price of gas when measured per unit of energy, gas will increasingly displace oil in other uses such as powering heavy trucks and possibly conversion of gas to liquid fuels.

With all these factors pushing up demand, the price of natural gas has to go up, and the only question is how high. Longer term production will likely increase as well, dampening the price shocks, but natural gas prices have a long history of volatility, and there is no reason to think they will stabilize now.

Gas plants might outlive the boom. The Energy Information Agency says the U.S. has enough “technically recoverable” natural gas to last us 92 years at 2010 consumption levels,[1] a figure it has revised so often, and by so much, that no one places much confidence in it. Assuming they have it right this time, 92 years at 2010 levels is not as reassuring as it sounds. Higher consumption rates as utilities replace coal with gas plants, coupled with a rise in exports of LNG into the international market, will cause that 92 year-supply figure to shrink dramatically. Supplying gas generating plants for their full 30-plus year lifespans might require us to pay much higher prices or to import LNG at whatever price the international market sets. (Indeed, LNG terminals conceived just a few years ago were built as import terminals.)

Recoverable gas supplies could also decrease dramatically if states or localities impose drilling bans or cutbacks due to concerns about drinking water contamination and air pollution associated with gas “fracking”; because of problems disposing of the contaminated wastewater; or due to an unwillingness in dry states to allocate the huge amounts of fresh water consumed in the fracking process.

Price stability doesn’t matter to utilities—but it does to consumers. Utilities pass through the cost of fuel directly to ratepayers, so price spikes have no effect on a utility’s bottom line. Dominion Virginia Power earns a high profit on the capital cost of a new generating plant, so its incentive is to build as much new generation as it can. From a profit standpoint, it is indifferent to fuel costs.

From a consumer’s perspective, however, fuel costs matter very much. We pay for both the construction of the new plant and for the cost of fuel for as long as the plant operates.  For us, a new coal or gas plant is like a variable rate mortgage; we know what our monthly payment will be in the first year, but after that it is anybody’s guess. Worse, we’re locked in for 30 years with no ability to refinance or renegotiate. If you had a choice, would you agree to buy something for 30 years when you only know the price today?

As it happens, we do have a choice. Wind turbines and solar panels are like a fixed-rate mortgage. Once you’ve built the wind farm or installed the solar panels, the fuel is free. You know from the start exactly what you will be paying over the life of the project. People choose higher fixed-rate mortgages over variable rate mortgages for the same reasons we should favor renewable energy over new fossil fuel plants, even with the ultra-low teaser rate being offered for natural gas today.

Virginia’s State Corporation Commission has been reluctant to embrace renewable energy, feeling itself on solid ground only with the certainty of fossil fuels priced with time horizons of three years or less. This attitude has likely influenced Dominion to favor a natural-gas-only strategy over one that would hedge unsustainably low current gas prices with the long-term price stability of renewable energy. Yet a hedging strategy would be the more prudent one. Using the savings from cheap gas today to pay for equal amounts of renewable energy would give us lower electricity costs both now and for the next thirty years, compared to what we would have with natural gas alone.

There are many other reasons for Virginia to invest in renewable energy, from job creation to cleaner air and water, to getting in on the ground floor of innovative technologies. Dominion should not close off these options by filling all its new generation needs with natural gas plants that commit us for the next 30 years. Ratepayers should insist on a strategy that incorporates at least as much renewable energy as natural gas.

A version of this article originally appeared in the Virginian-Pilot on September 16, 2012 

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Is offshore wind in Virginia’s future?

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The past couple of years have been tough ones for the offshore wind industry, which is still struggling to launch. The recession has made states reluctant to invest, even when the payoff looks huge. Cheap natural gas is hurting the market for renewable energy just as wind and solar have started hitting their stride. Congressional dysfunction has prevented the renewal of critical tax credits that the wind industry still needs to compete.

A few other states are making fitful progress towards building offshore wind farms, but they have conditions Virginia doesn’t: higher energy prices that make offshore wind more competitive with fossil fuels, renewable energy standards that push utilities to become buyers for the electricity, and congested transmission grids that favor local generation.

But of course, Virginia has its own advantages, including possibly the best wind resources in the mid-Atlantic, skilled workers, and extremely competitive port facilities. And the enthusiasm of our legislators and public for the idea of offshore wind matches that of any state.

At the same time, though, our governor and our major utility give decidedly mixed signals, extolling our offshore wind potential at one moment, and in the next opining that no one would actually want to pay for it. And yet Dominion Power hopes to buy up all the Virginia-area offshore wind leases that are offered for bid this fall. So what gives with Dominion and offshore wind?

One answer comes from Guy Chapman, Dominion’s Director of Renewable Energy Research and Program Development, who spoke at a wind conference held at James Madison University this past June. He said that right now with natural gas so cheap, the company doesn’t expect to build any wind at all, on land or at sea. But if conditions improve, the company wants to be in a position to change its mind, and that means buying up the offshore leases and doing site surveys, technical and environmental studies, and other planning that will add up to $40 or 50 million. Dominion would rather lose the money than be locked out of a potential new growth area.

What this means for the rest of us is that when we read somewhere that Dominion has “plans” for offshore wind, or that it has two wind farms in Virginia’s mountains “under development,” we should realize it defines those terms to mean, “Don’t hold your breath, honey.”

This presents something of a puzzle for decision-makers at the federal Department of Interior. If they let Dominion buy up the leases for the whole Virginia wind energy area, knowing the company isn’t actually planning to build a wind farm, then they aren’t advancing the cause of offshore wind any. By contrast, the other bidders include companies like Apex Wind and Fishermen’s Energy that make their money by building wind farms, so they are highly motivated to follow through.

Selling the lease to Dominion might mean no one builds a wind farm off Virginia. That would be okay with Dominion—for a monopoly, keeping out competition is an end in itself—but it wouldn’t serve the public interest.

On the other hand, if something happened to make Dominion actually want to build, the fact that it’s a regulated utility means they could probably do it more cheaply than Apex or Fishermen’s. That would benefit ratepayers and make the energy more competitive with other fuels, like natural gas.

What might make Dominion want to build? Some combination of the following factors would likely play a part:

The cost of offshore wind might come down relative to fossil fuels. With no offshore wind farms operating in the U.S. yet, cost projections are still speculative. The first projects here will be expensive, as all “firsts” are, but industry members are confident that prices will come down dramatically as the industry matures. Dominion and other companies and researchers, using federal grants, are currently studying opportunities to slash costs.

Virginia might grow bolder. It’s conceivable, though not really likely, that Virginia will take a decisive step towards offshore wind by enacting an effective renewable energy standard or offshore wind mandate, to replace the sham that is our current renewable energy law. This wouldn’t happen under Bob McDonnell’s leadership; in spite of his “all of the above” rhetoric, he is adamantly opposed to real change in state policies that favor coal. Chances would improve in 2014 under Terry McAuliffe or possibly Bill Bolling (but not Ken Cuccinnelli).

Congress might finally take action to deal with climate change. Sure, and pigs might fly. But drought and heat waves are changing minds across the country about the reality of global warming. Even skeptics may decide to hedge their bets. And even if not, the economic and national security case for renewable energy has already swayed some conservatives, and may bring more on board as other countries outpace us. A carbon tax, a national renewable electricity standard, or some other incentive would do for offshore wind in Virginia what Virginia isn’t likely to do itself.

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Why Virginia Lags on Solar

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Solar energy is one of the fastest-growing industries in the country. Solar PV installations grew 109% in 2011, and the industry now employs over 100,000 Americans. Yet it is almost invisible in Virginia. The installed total in the commonwealth is about 5 megawatts (MW), a pittance compared to the 1,200 MW in California and over 800 in New Jersey. Maryland and North Carolina each have more than ten times as much solar PV as we do.

Part of the reason is our lack of incentives. Unlike many other states in the northeast and mid-Atlantic, Virginia offers no tax credits or rebates on solar systems to supplement the federal tax credit. And our voluntary renewable portfolio standard is so flabby that our utilities will never need solar to meet it.

Virginia also isn’t known for getting out ahead of the curve on energy. Instead of embracing the promise of clean power, the state clings to an old energy model dominated by fossil fuels. Just this year, the General Assembly renewed a subsidy that takes about $45 million every year out of the pockets of taxpayers to support coal mining.

But as a recent article in the New York Times Magazine described (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/magazine/the-secret-to-solar-power.htm?src=dayp), the future has come knocking. With the price of solar energy tumbling, solar now makes economic sense across much of the country. New financing models make it possible to install solar with no upfront capital cost to the customer, who may see immediate savings over grid-delivered “brown” energy.

Among these new models, leases have become especially popular for homeowners and businesses, but only power purchase agreements (PPAs) allow non-profits to take advantage of tax credits. Under a PPA, the solar installer retains ownership of the solar system and uses the tax credits to offset profits, passing along the savings as it sells the power to the nonprofit.

PPAs could permit the solar market in Virginia to blossom in a big way. Colleges and universities, private schools, churches, charities and local governments are now looking at solar systems as a way to meet carbon-reduction targets and reduce energy costs over the long haul.

Unfortunately, this new enthusiasm has run headlong into the immovable force known as Dominion Power. Dominion blocked a PPA at Washington & Lee University last fall, and its threat of legal action has kept other non-profits from moving forward with plans for solar installations.

Dominion is a regulated monopoly in Virginia, a status that gives it the sole right to sell power in its territory, with a few exceptions. One of the exceptions gives sellers of 100% renewable electricity the right to sell to Dominion’s customers if the company itself doesn’t offer that option—which, indisputably, it does not. (Its Green Power Program relies on certificates, not actual green electricity.)

So Dominion’s interpretation of the statute appears to be wrong on its face, but one of the nice things about being a giant monopoly is that you have more lawyers and more money than the people you threaten.

Unable to fund a lawsuit, the solar industry tried last year to get relief from the General Assembly in the form of HB 129, a bill that would have made explicit the right of renewable energy companies to sell power to their customers through PPAs. Delegate Jerry Kilgore (R-Gate City) shepherded the bill through the House, where it passed without a single dissenting vote. Once in the Senate, though, it was “carried over” (effectively, killed) by a Senate committee stacked with Dominion allies like Dick Saslaw (D-Fairfax) and Chairman John Watkins (R-Midlothian).

Quick quiz, but not a toughie: according to the Virginia Public Access Project, www.vpap.org, who is the top donor to the campaign chests of Dick Saslaw and John Watkins?

The failure of HB 129 leaves a lot of would-be solar and wind customers in limbo, keeps Virginia companies from growing and adding jobs, and prevents churches, colleges and universities from benefiting from the federal tax credits that are available to residents of other states where PPAs are common.

It has also given Dominion a black eye with the public and local officials. Critics say the heavy-handed effort to squash small solar companies shows the utility giant has grown overly complacent about its status as the most powerful force in Richmond.

Dominion should back down from its unreasonable opposition to PPAs. It has little to lose by allowing private companies the space to compete and innovate in a market Dominion itself doesn’t serve. And if it won’t back off, then the public needs to remind its legislators who they serve. Hint: it’s not supposed to be Dominion.